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Abstract
We analyse the possibility that string-theoretic dualities present a genuine case of
strong underdetermination of theory by evidence. Drawing on the parallel discussion
of the hole argument, we assess the possible interpretations of dualities. We conclude
that there exist at least two defensible interpretations on which dualities do not present a
worrying case of underdetermination per se.
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1 Introduction
“I dreamt of a... nightmarish cafe´, brilliantly lit, but underground, with no way
out. I’d been dead a long, long time. The waitresses all had the same face. The
food was soap, the only drink was cups of lather. The music in the cafe´ was...
this.” [29]
Within contemporary philosophy of science, scientific realists are sometimes charged with
accounting for the possibility of strong underdetermination of theory by evidence, i.e. the
possibility of the existence of multiple competing scientific theories which make different
ontological claims about the world, yet which are all empirically adequate. Such cases are
supposed to be problematic for the realist, as there exists no principled means of determining
which theory should be endorsed as correctly describing the world. Nevertheless, in the ab-
sence of any concrete and convincing cases of this phenomenon, the realist has often made
light of the problem: if it is to be taking seriously, the burden is on her opponents to provide
convincing examples.
In fact though, the dearth of cases of strong underdetermination may be reaching an end.
This is in light of the phenomenon of duality, which has recently arisen in the context of string
theory. Roughly, two theories T and T˜ are dual when there is an exact equivalence (or, to
use the terminology of [49], a “dictionary”) between their models respecting all correlation
functions, with both theories therefore making identical empirical predictions [42]. As stated
in [1], dualities in quantum field theory and string theory are often very intricate: T and T˜
generally have different microscopic degrees of freedom, and different actions. Having said
that, we will also see that there are some cases of self-duality, where T and T˜ turn out to be
the very same theory.
One of the most characteristic features of string theory is the preponderance of such du-
alities. The existence of such ontologically distinct yet empirically equivalent theories can be
read prima facie as a genuine case of strong underdetermination. Faced with this, many ques-
tions naturally arise. For example: do two respective models of T and T˜ really describe two
different possible worlds, or do they in fact merely describe the same world? Or: does there
exist a principled means by which one can consider one of T and T˜ to be more fundamental
3
than the other, and thereby to preference its ontological claims?1 Faced with such questions,
it is incumbent on us to investigate the appropriate interpretation of dualities.
When assessing possible interpretations of dualities, it is helpful to make sure that we
have fully explored the space of possible responses. To this end, it can be useful to draw from
other debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. Recently, Rickles has
suggested an analogy between the infamous hole argument in General Relativity and dualities
[43]. In the case of the hole argument, we are supposed to face a troubling indeterminism at the
heart of General Relativity; our task is either to find some way of interpreting the models of the
theory in order to avoid this problem, or to find some means of accepting the indeterminism
while diffusing its potency. Analogously, in the case of dualities, we must find some way of
interpreting the dual theories such that either only one set of ontological claims is privileged,
or an explanation is given as to how the existence of multiple models of theories making
distinct ontological yet empirically equivalent claims is unproblematic.
Drawing on the responses to the hole argument, we find that there are four possible classes
of response to string-theoretic dualities. First, one can accept this as a genuine case of under-
determination, and then try to argue either that (a) the underdetermination is unproblematic,
(b) the two dual theories are complementary and their ontological claims are reconcilable, (c)
the two theories are better interpreted as being embedded in a “deeper” theory, which makes a
unique set of ontological claims. Second, one can argue that two models of the dual theories
in fact only describe one possible world; any difference between the two is unphysical and can
be “quotiented out”, in a manner analogous to gauge redundancies in e.g. Yang-Mills theory.
Third, one can try to interpret the manifolds on which the dual theories are defined in a way
that removes the ontological underdetermination. Fourth, one can try to privilege the ontolog-
ical claims of the models of just one of the theories in a dual pair. In fact, we will find that,
by combining the above options, there are two prima facie viable routes available to us which
diffuse the underdetermination.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, in section 2 we provide a precise charac-
terisation of the differences between symmetries, gauge redundancies, and dualities; this will
be useful in what follows. In sections 3 and 4, we provide a brief summary of the relevant
technical details pertaining to string-theoretic dualities and the hole argument, respectively. In
1Such claims are often made in the context of the so-called AdS/CFT correspondence, for example.
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section 5, we undertake an in-depth analysis of the possible interpretations of string dualities.
We close in section 6 with an assessment of these interpretations, and some outlook for the
future.
2 Symmetries, Gauge Redundancies and Dualities
Before we begin our discussion of string dualities, we must make precise the distinction be-
tween symmetries, gauge redundancies, and dualities. In order to do this, we first follow
Healey [15] in defining empirical symmetries and theoretical symmetries:
Definition 1. (Empirical symmetry) A mapping φ : S → S of a set of situations onto itself
is an empirical symmetry if and only if no two situations related by φ can be distinguished by
means of measurements confined to each situation.
Definition 2. (Theoretical symmetry) A mapping f : Λ→ Λ of a set Λ of models of a theory
Θ onto itself is a theoretical symmetry of Θ if and only if for every modelM ∈ Λ of Θ that
may be used to represent a situation S in a possible world w, f (M) may also be used to
represent S in w.
Here, situation is taken to mean something akin to configuration of a physical system.
With this in mind, in [15] Healey defends the thesis that the distinction between symmetry
transformations (simpliciter) and gauge transformations (gauge redundancies) can be made as
follows:
Definition 3. (Symmetry transformation) A theoretical symmetry of a theory with a corre-
sponding non-trivial empirical symmetry among the situations it represents.
Definition 4. (Gauge transformation) A theoretical symmetry of a theory with no corre-
sponding non-trivial empirical symmetry among the situations it represents.
Such a distinction seems to be a good explication of the de facto usage of these terms in the
relevant physics literature. Symmetries (simpliciter) are structure-preserving transformations
which relate to one another solutions of the equations of motion of some theory (or a physical
system described by the theory); in each case the application of the symmetry to a solution
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leads to another solution representing a distinct physically possible state of the system. Unlike
symmetries, gauge transformations do not map between physically distinct possibilities, but
rather map one representation of a state to another representation of the same state. In fact,
physical state is really shorthand for equivalence class of states under gauge symmetries, so
that physical states are represented by entire gauge orbits rather than their elements [42].
In contrast to symmetries and gauge transformations, there exists a class of transforma-
tions relating physical theories, rather than states within a theory; these are known as duali-
ties. Roughly, two theories are dual whenever they determine the same physics; i.e. the same
correlation functions, physical spectra, etc. By analogy with symmetries, one is faced with
a space whose elements are theories, as opposed to states or configurations, so that dualities
map one theory onto another in a way that preserves all ‘physical’ predictions [42, 51].
To be more precise, consider a theory T , characterised by a number of parameters λi. The
space of the λi is denoted U , the so called parameter space or moduli space of the theory.2
Fixing all the λi fixes a specific model M of T , corresponding to a specific point u ∈ U .3
Now suppose that there exists a second theory T˜ , with parameters λ˜i and parameter space U˜ .
We can construct a definition of duality as follows:
Definition 5. (Duality) Theory T is dual to theory T˜ if and only if for every u ∈ U with
associated modelM, there exists an associated u˜ ∈ U˜ with model M˜ such thatM and M˜
are empirically equivalent. This duality map is symmetric and one-to-one, and so amounts to
an isomorphism between U and U˜ .
Typically, the duality isomorphism involves pairs of models of theories with radically dif-
ferent structural properties, such that they would appear to be wholly unrelated. We can dis-
tinguish between two kinds of duality: those that relate models of pairs of distinct theories
T and T˜ , and those that relate (apparently quite distinct) models of one and the same theory
T . We call these external duality and self-duality, respectively. As Rickles states [42], since
self-dualities state an equivalence between descriptions of one and the same system, they are
often construed as gauge symmetries (though of a rather surprising nature), representing some
interpretative ambiguity in the theory’s formulation. We shall return to this point shortly.
2The λi are not free, but are in fact highly constrained. For example, the relevant λi parameterising the moduli
space of vacua of a supersymmetric gauge theory often form an affine algebraic variety.
3This space might therefore be identified with the space of kinematically possible models, defined in e.g. [38].
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Finally, it is important to keep clear the distinction between theories, models, and possible
worlds. We denote such objects by T ,M, and W , respectively. The apparent underdetermi-
nation in the case of dualities can be expressed as follows: we have two theories T and T˜ ,
with respective modelsM and M˜. Both these models are empirically adequate to the actual
world4, yet appear to represent distinct possible worldsW1 andW2. Hence, we face a problem
of determining which world of W1 and W2 is the actual world. In the case where T and T˜
coincide (i.e. in the case of self-dualities), we still have two distinct models corresponding to
two possible worlds, and so still face a prima facie case of underdetermination.
3 String Theory and its Dualities
With precise distinctions between symmetries, gauge redundancies, and dualities in hand, we
can now move on to consider dualities in string theory. In this section, we first provide a
very brief pre´cis of perturbative string theory, before proceeding to discuss T-duality, mirror
symmetry, S-duality, and the AdS/CFT correspondence.
3.1 Perturbative String Theory
A string can be regarded as a special case of a p-brane, which is an object with p spatial di-
mensions and tension Tp = 1/ (2piα′), where α′ is the Regge slope parameter. In fact, various
p-branes do appear in superstring theory as non-perturbative excitations. The classical motion
of a p-brane extremises the (p+ 1)-dimensional volume V that it sweeps out in space-time.
Thus there is a p-brane action that is given by Sp = −TpV . In the case of the fundamen-
tal string, which has p = 1, V is the area of the string world sheet and the action is called
the Nambu-Goto action [50]. Classically, the Nambu-Goto action is equivalent to the string
4Throughout this paper, we consider a hypothetical scenario in which the dual theories under consideration
do give realistic possible models of the world. Examples such as that of the AdS/CFT correspondence presented
in section 3 do not relate empirically viable theories.
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sigma-model action (also known as the Polyakov action):
Sσ = − 1
4piα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
√−hhαβηµν∂αXµ∂βXν (3.1)
where σ and τ are coordinates on the world sheet, hαβ (σ, τ) is an auxiliary5 world sheet
metric, h = dethαβ , and hαβ is the inverse of hαβ . Σ denotes the world sheet, and d2σ =
dσdτ . The functions Xµ (σ, τ) describe the spacetime embedding of the string world sheet.
The Euler-Lagrange equation for hαβ can be used to eliminate it from the action and recover
the Nambu-Goto action. Quantum mechanically, instead of eliminating h via its classical field
equations, one should perform a path integral, using standard machinery to deal with the local
symmetries and gauge fixing. Doing this, one finds that there is a conformal anomaly unless
the space-time dimension is D = 26. An analogous analysis for superstrings (i.e. strings for
which supersymmetry is added - either on the world sheet as in the so-called RNS sector, or to
the background spacetime as in the GS sector) gives the critical dimension D = 10 [1].
When one uses the superstring formalism for both left-moving modes and right-moving
modes on the string, the fermions associated with the left-movers and the right-movers can
have either the same or opposite chirality. These two possibilities give different theories called
the type IIA and type IIB superstring theories, respectively. A third possibility, called type I
superstring theory, can be derived from the type IIB theory by quotienting out by its left-right
symmetry, a procedure called orientifold projection. The strings that survive this projection
are unoriented. A more intriguing possibility is to use the formalism of the 26-dimensional
bosonic string for the left-movers and the formalism of the 10-dimensional superstring for
the right-movers. The string theories constructed in this way are called heterotic. The extra
sixteen left-moving dimensions must describe a torus with very special properties to give a
consistent theory. There are precisely two distinct tori that have the required properties, and
they correspond to the Lie algebras of SO (32) and E8 × E8. Thus, there are five consistent
superstring theories: types I, IIA/B, and heterotic SO (32) or E8 × E8.
The parameter τ in the embedding functionsXµ (σ, τ) is the world sheet time coordinate; σ
parametrizes the string at a given world sheet time. For a closed string, which is topologically a
5In the sense that hαβ is a new variable, a priori independent of the pullback of the spacetime metric to the
world sheet.
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circle, one must impose periodicity in the spatial parameter σ. Choosing its range to be pi, one
identifies both ends of the string Xµ (σ, τ) = Xµ (σ + pi, τ). All string theories contain closed
strings, and the graviton always appears as a massless mode in the closed-string spectrum of
string theories in the critical dimension.
We can see the appearance of the graviton in the string spectrum as follows. After quan-
tising the string and defining suitable ladder operators, one can act on the ground state of the
string with raising operators to study its spectrum. One finds that for the closed bosonic string
and the RNS type II closed superstring in the so-called NS-NS sector (which is one way of
imposing boundary conditions on worldsheet fermions), the first excited states correspond to
gij , Bij , and Φ. gij is symmetric and traceless in i and j and transforms under SO (D − 2) as
a massless, spin-two particle, the graviton (here, D is the critical dimension of the string). Bij
transforms under SO (D − 2) as an antisymmetric, second-rank tensor, with associated three-
form field strength Hijk. The trace term Φ is a massless scalar, which is called the dilation.
We can add (for reasons that will become clear shortly) the dilation field to the string action
as a background field in a term of the form:
SΦ =
1
4pi
∫
Σ
Φ (X)R(2) (h) d2z (3.2)
where R(2) (h) is the scalar curvature of the two-dimensional string world sheet computed
from the world-sheet metric hαβ . The dilaton plays a crucial role in defining the string per-
turbation expansion. This can be best understood by considering the case in which Φ is a
constant. (More generally, if Φ approaches a constant at infinity, it is possible to separate this
constant mode from the rest of Φ and focus on its contribution. [1]) The key observation is
that, when Φ is a constant, the integrand in (3.2) is a total derivative. This means that the value
of the integral is determined by the global topology of the world sheet, and this term does
not contribute to the classical field equations. The topological invariant that arises here is the
famous Euler characteristic of Σ:
χ (M) =
1
4pi
∫
Σ
R(2) (h) d2z (3.3)
Hence we see that if Φ = Φ0 for Φ0 a constant, then SΦ = Φ0χ. Now, when calculating
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string scattering amplitudes, one must (by extension of summing over all possible Feynman
diagram topologies in quantum field theory) sum over all possible world sheet topologies.
How should we weight this sum over different topologies? To answer this question, suppose
that Φ = Φ0 + φ (X), where φ (X) is zero in the vacuum, i.e. Φ0 is the vacuum expectation
value of Φ (X). Then there will appear a factor in the path integral of the form e−Φ0χ = g2(g−1)s ,
with gs ≡ eΦ0 and g the genus of Σ. In other words, the vacuum expectation value of the
dilation field determines the string coupling constant! This is a special case of a more general
lesson in string theory: all dimensionless numbers (e.g. coupling constants) that characterise
specific string vacua are determined as the vacuum expectation values of scalar fields. [1]
As a point of interest, note that the dilaton field acts like a Brans-Dicke scalar. In fact,
the effective gravity equations in string theory include a graviton-dilaton part that looks very
similar to the Brans-Dicke scalar-tensor theory of gravity.
3.2 T-Duality
As discussed, the massless fields that appear in the closed bosonic string spectrum or the NS-
NS sector of either of the type II superstrings consist of the spacetime metric gµν , the two-form
Bµν , and the dilation Φ. So far, we have only considered a flat background with vanishingBµν .
One can analyse more general possibilities by introducing the background fields into the world
sheet action. The appropriate generalisation of the world sheet action that includes the above
background fields6 is: [2]
S = − 1
4piα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
√−h
(
hαβ∂αX
µ∂βX
νgµν (X)
+ αβ∂αX
µ∂βX
νBµν (X) + α
′ΦR (h)
)
(3.4)
6One might reasonably ask: in what sense are gµν , Bµν and Φ background fields? All we have shown so far
is that they represent excited states of strings. The typical answer here runs along the following lines: when we
introduce these fields as “background fields” in spacetime, we envisage them as coherent states of strings at all
points in spacetime, at low energy so “stringy” effects can be ignored, so that they behave as typical quantum
fields. There is much room for conceptual clarification and expansion here; the author hopes to explore such
issues in a future paper.
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Our conventions are such that αβ = ±1/√−h. We can now introduce the phenomenon
of T-duality in the following way. First, assume that for some spacetime vector kµ, the back-
ground fields satisfy Lkg = LkΦ = 0 and LkH = 0, i.e. LkB = dω. (Recall: H = dB is the
field strength of B). Here, Lk is the Lie derivative in the direction k; Lkg = 0 clearly denotes
an isometry of the spacetime metric. We choose coordinates, called adapted coordinates,
Xµ = (θ,X i) such that kµ = (1, 0) and Lk = ∂θ, i.e. the isometry acts in the θ direction.
Using the invariance of the action under B → B + dω, we can choose all background fields
to be independent of the coordinate θ. In these coordinates, the action becomes:
S = − 1
4piα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
((
gθθ∂αθ∂βθ + 2gθi∂αθ∂βX
i + gij∂αX
i∂βX
j
)
ηαβ
+
(
2Bθi∂αθ∂βX
i +Bij∂αX
i∂βX
j
)
αβ
)
(3.5)
We now rewrite this action in first order form:
S ′ = − 1
4piα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
((
gθθVαVβ + 2gθiVα∂βX
i + gij∂αX
i∂βX
j
)
ηαβ
+
(
2BθiVα∂βX
i +Bij∂αX
i∂βX
j
)
αβ + 2θ˜αβ∂αVβ
)
(3.6)
where in the functional integral, we now integrate over X i, θ and θ˜. The Vα do not have
physical meaning and are used purely as mathematical tools: integrating over the Lagrange
multiplier field θ˜ enforces dV = 0 with solution Vα = ∂αθ; inserting this into the action (3.6)
leads back to the action (3.5). Alternatively, we can integrate out the Vα, i.e. eliminate them
via their equations of motion. If we define:
Lα =
1
gθθ
(
gθi∂βX
iηαβ +
(
Bθi∂βX
i + ∂β θ˜
)
αβ
)
(3.7)
we can rewrite (3.6) in the form:
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S ′ = − 1
4piα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
((
gθθV˜αV˜β − gθθLαLβ + gij∂αX i∂βXj
)
ηαβ
+Bij∂αX
i∂βX
jαβ
)
(3.8)
where V˜α = Vα + Lα and V˜ = 0 is the equation of motion for Vα. Making a change of
variables and integrating over V˜ , one obtains the dual action:
S˜ = − 1
4piα′
∫
Σ
d2σ
((
g˜θθ∂αθ˜∂β θ˜ + 2g˜θi∂αθ˜∂βX
i + g˜ij∂αX
i∂βX
j
)
ηαβ
+
(
2B˜θi∂αθ˜∂βX
i + B˜ij∂αX
i∂βX
j
)
αβ
)
(3.9)
with:
g˜θθ =
1
gθθ
g˜θi =
1
gθθ
Bθi B˜θi =
1
gθθ
gθi
g˜ij = gij − 1
gθθ
(gθigθj −BθiBθj) B˜ij = Bij − 1
gθθ
(gθiBθj −Bθigθj) (3.10)
These are the Buscher rules for the string frame metric and antisymmetric tensor field
[2]. The Jacobian of the change of variables in the path integral, which is necessary in the
dualisation procedure, is non-trivial, and, after appropriate regularisation, can be shown to
lead to a shift in the dilaton:
Φ˜ = Φ− 1
2
log |gθθ| = Φ− 1
4
log
∣∣∣∣gθθg˜θθ
∣∣∣∣ (3.11)
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Combining this with g2θθ det g˜ = det g, one finds the T-duality invariant combination [2]:
e−2Φ˜
√
det g˜ = e−2Φ
√
det g (3.12)
Our derivation of the Buscher rules applies whenever the target space has an Abelian isom-
etry. In superstring theories, the fermion fields also transform under T-duality; one finds that
a T-duality transformation takes the type IIA theory to the type IIB theory and vice versa; and
also relates the two heterotic theories.
T-duality is an exact symmetry, i.e. one that holds to all orders in perturbation theory [37].
By analogy with gauge theories, we can understand T-duality transformations for the bosonic
string as effecting a self-duality that identifies points in the parameter space of the theory [42].
For the two type II superstrings and the two heterotic strings, the duality identifies points in the
parameter space of the corresponding theory. Finally, we note that there exists an extension
of T-duality, known as mirror symmetry, in which the two dual theories are defined on topo-
logically inequivalent manifolds [41]. From a philosophical point of view, mirror symmetry
presents the curious result that theories on very different manifolds are physically equivalent
with respect to all observables. Mirror symmetry will prove important in our subsequent anal-
ysis of the interpretation of dualities.
3.3 S-Duality
Though the above characterisation of T-duality shall provide us with most of the tools neces-
sary to draw substantive philosophical conclusions on the nature of dualities, it is worth briefly
describing another well-known string-theoretic duality, called S-duality. S-duality relates the
string coupling constant gs to 1/gs. The two basic examples relate the type I superstring the-
ory to the SO (32) heterotic string theory and the type IIB superstring theory to itself. Thus,
given our knowledge of the small gs behaviour of these theories, given by perturbation theory,
we learn how the dual theory behaves when gs  1. In other words, strongly coupled type I
theory is equivalent to weakly coupled SO (32) heterotic theory; the type IIB case the theory
is related to itself [1].
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3.4 Gauge-Gravity Duality
Some of the most widely discussed results in contemporary theoretical physics relate to the
phenomenon of gauge-gravity duality, and in particular the so-called AdS/CFT correspon-
dence, first proposed by Maldacena in 1997 [25]. The guiding idea underlying this duality
is the holographic principle, which states that for some description of a system of particles
interacting gravitationally, we are able to describe the physics via a theory involving only the
boundary of the spacetime region containing the system [49].
In the AdS/CFT correspondence, the spacetime dimensions of the two theories must be
radically different for the duality to establish itself [40]. For instance, type IIB string theory
on the product space AdS5 × S5 is equivalent to N = 4 supersymmetric Yang-Mills theory
on the four-dimensional boundary of the AdS5 space [25]. The explanation for the mismatch
in dimensionality is as follows: the spacetime dimensions corresponding to the space S5 on
the string theory side become internal degrees of freedom of particles on the gauge side (cor-
responding to its SO (6) global symmetry), while the remaining dimension of the AdS5 space
becomes an energy scale in the dual gauge theory [40, 56].
Let us consider this specific case of the AdS/CFT duality in more detail (following the
very clear exposition of [40]). AdS5 × S5 is characterised by the metric:
ds2 =
r2
R2
ηµνdx
µdxν +
R2
r2
dr2 +R2dΩ25 (3.13)
Here, µ = 0 . . . 3, so the xµ are four coordinates on AdS5; r is the so-called radial di-
mension. Ω5 gives the metric of the unit five-sphere S5. R ≡ lstring/λ2t′Hooft is the scale of
spacetime relative to the string scale. λt′Hooft ≡ g2YMNc and lstring ≡ α′1/2, where gYM is the
Yang-Mills coupling constant and the physical meaning of Nc will be introduced shortly.
This metric corresponds to the horizon (in a sense defined below) of a D3-brane (a Dp-
brane is a p-brane on which an open string can end; the ‘D’ stands for Dirichlet boundary
conditions). The intuitive picture behind the AdS/CFT correspondence in this case is then as
follows. First, imagine a stack of Nc parallel D-branes. It is known that D-branes gravitate,
with gravitational coupling strength determined by gs. The warping of spacetime geometry
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away from Minkowski is then determined by Ncgs [40]. Given fixed Nc we can tune the
parameter gs across a range of values from very small to very large. This warping will be
minimal, and the spacetime near flat, when Ncgs  1. In this case, there can be both opened
and closed strings, but with low coupling strength they will be virtually decoupled from each
other. The closed strings that decouple from the open strings give a picture of linearised,
perturbative gravity. The open strings stuck to the D-branes are described by a gauge theory
with Nc colours restricted to the D-brane stack [40].
On increasing the coupling strength so that Ncgs  1, the gravitational effect of the D-
branes on the spacetime metric becomes non-negligible, leading to a curved geometry; in fact,
a black hole geometry (or black brane geometry). By analogy with a Reissner-Nordstro¨m
black hole, this geometry is AdS5×S5 [18]. Strings near the event horizon will be red shifted
from the point of view of distant observers, and so will appear to have low energies. In the
limit of low energies (ignoring massive states) the strings near the event horizon will decouple
from the strings on the (flat) conformal boundary [40].
Putting these two scenarios together, at weak coupling the physics is described by a gauge
theory on flat space, while at strong coupling it is described by a closed string theory on
AdS5 × S5. Maldacena conjectured that there was a duality linking these two descriptions
together, by varying the t’Hooft parameter λt′Hooft, so that it was really one theory being
viewed from different regions of parameter space [25, 40].
The holographic nature of the duality is evident from the fact that one is dealing with
boundary data in the string theory. It is the boundary data that uniquely determines the gauge
field theory. The gauge theory lives on the r → ∞ conformal boundary of AdS5, with the
string theory defined throughout the r < ∞ interior, i.e. the bulk. The above equivalence7
implies that the Hilbert spaces of these two quantum theories will be equivalent, which is
curious since they are built up from very different types of object: strings, branes, gravitons,
etc. on the string theory side and local gauge-invariant functionals of the gauge fields and their
derivatives on the other [40]. If correct though, string theory (with quantum gravity) can be
translated into the language of a fairly ordinary conformal field theory!
7It is worth noting that this equivalence has not been proven. Nevertheless, a vast number of non-trivial
correspondences between theories linked by such dualities gives physicists confidence that the equivalence is
correct.
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4 The Hole Argument
In this section, we briefly recap the setup of, and potential responses to, the hole argument of
General Relativity. Exploring the possible solutions to this problem will prove useful when it
comes to discussing the possible interpretations of dualities.
4.1 Setup
The hole argument is an infamous problem case in the foundations of General Relativity (GR),
originally raised by Einstein during the development of the theory (in the ultimately misguided
attempt to demonstrate that no generally covariant theory is admissible as a theory of grav-
ity [32]), and subsequently resuscitated by Earman and Norton [10], this time as a means to
arguing against the reification of the manifold in GR. In other words, the argument was de-
ployed by Earman and Norton to argue in favour of relationism (REL) about spacetime and
against substantivalism (SUB), where these are defined as follows [39]:
Definition 6. (Substantivalism) A complete catalogue of the fundamental objects in the uni-
verse lists, in addition to the elementary constituents of material entities, the basic parts of
spacetime.
Definition 7. (Relationism) Claims apparently about spacetime itself are ultimately to be
understood as claims about material entities and the possible patterns of spatiotemporal rela-
tions they can instantiate.
We take it that SUB ↔ ¬REL. Let us recall how the hole argument proceeds, follow-
ing [38, 39]. LetM1 = 〈M, gab, Tab〉 be a model of a generally relativistic theory. Here, M
represents the spacetime manifold8, gab the metric on this manifold, and Tab the stress-energy
tensor of the theory9. It follows from the diffeomorphism invariance of GR that, for an ar-
bitrary diffeomorphism d,M2 = 〈M,d∗gab, d∗Tab〉 also satisfies the theory’s equations. The
natural (though not ineluctable) conclusion is thatM1 andM2 jointly represent spacetimes
(call them W1 and W2) that are physically possible according to the theory.
8In discussions of the hole argument, the focus is on manifold substantivalism, according to which spacetime
is identified with the manifold M . The hole argument does not necessarily speak against metric substantivalism,
which states that the metric field gab forms an essential part of spacetime. See also footnote 12.
9Note that we are now using abstract (i.e. coordinate-free) indices, denoted by Roman letters.
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InM1, each p ∈ M is assigned certain properties encoded by 〈gab (p) , Tab (p)〉; inM2, p
is assigned the generically distinct properties encoded by 〈d∗gab (p) , d∗Tab (p)〉. But, accord-
ing to the substantivalist, M represents physical spacetime. This means that (on one natural
understanding of how the points of M represent physical spacetime points),M1 andM2 rep-
resent one and the same spacetime point as having different properties. This gives us the next
ingredient in the argument: the claim that the substantivalist is committed to regardingW1 and
W2 as distinct possible worlds10. [38]
The problem is that, if this interpretation of spacetime models is permitted, GR is radically
indeterministic. Let d be a hole diffeomorphism, i.e. a map that is only non-trivial within a
restricted region of M (the so-called hole). Suppose that, relative to the metric ofM1, d is
only non-trivial to the future of some spacelike hypersurface Ψ. M1 and M2 will then be
identical structures up to and including this surface but differ to its future. On the proposed
interpretation of M1 and M2, they represent spacetimes that are identical up to the space
like surface represented by Ψ but that differ to its future. It follows that the equations of
GR, together with a complete specification of the history of the world up to some spacelike
hypersurface, fail to fix the future.
The essence of the hole indeterminism, then, is a follows: Let W1 and W2 be distinct
possible world that are physically possible according to some theory T 11. Suppose that W1
andW2 are identical up to some time t but differ after t. A complete specification of a possible
world up to t does not distinguish between W1 and W2. Hence the history of a world up
to t, together with T , can fail to fix the future of that world. It is important to emphasise
that Earman and Norton do not see this as a problem for substantivalism because they think
indeterminism is objectionable per se [39]. Their claim, rather, is that determinism should
fail only for reasons of physics and not as the result of a metaphysical commitment and in a
theory-independent way:
Our argument does not stem from a conviction that determinism is or ought to be
true... Rather our point is this. If a metaphysics which forces all our theories to
be deterministic is unacceptable, then equally a metaphysics which automatically
decided in favour of indeterminism, is unacceptable. Determinism may fail, but
10This is Earman and Norton’s so-called acid test of substantivalism.
11Not necessarily GR, for the same problem may arise in any theory defined on a manifold, with diffeomor-
phism invariance of the fields.
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if it fails, it should fail for a reason of physics, not because of commitment to
substantival properties which can be eradicated without affecting the empirical
consequences of the theory. [10]
Note that M1 and M2 are isomorphic structures (something which is not true in many
cases of duality: a point to which we shall return shortly). The possibilities they represent,
therefore, involve exactly the same patterns of qualitative features. If W1 and W2 are distinct
possibilities, they differ only over which spacetime points instantiate which of the particular
features common to both worlds. In the terminology of modal metaphysics, the difference
between the possibilities is merely haecceitistic [22].
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Earman and Norton do not make explicit the defini-
tion of determinism used in the above setup for the hole argument. As Brighouse states [3],
clearly the failure of some brand of Laplacian determinism is what they have in mind, whereby
agreement (of some kind) on a given region is insufficient to ensure agreement (of some kind)
throughout spacetime. With this in mind, we can follow Brighouse in defining determinism as
follows: [3]
Definition 8. (Determinism) A spacetime theory T is deterministic if and only if for any given
modelsM1 andM2 of T , if those models are physically equivalent before time t (or, at time
t) then they are physically equivalent for all times.
Most will agree that definition (8) adequately expresses the idea of determinism. The issue
as to whether a theory satisfies definition (8) will depend on which relation between models
defines when two models are physically equivalent.
4.2 Responses to the Hole Argument
Following Pooley [39], when situating possible classes of response to the hole argument, it is
helpful to lay out the following claims:
HAE :M1 andM2 (can be taken) to represent distinct physically possible worlds.
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LZE :M1 andM2 (must be taken to) represent the same possible world.
ONE : IfM1 is taken to represent a possible world, thenM2 does not represent a possible
world.
Earman and Norton’s argument that substantivalism commits us to indeterminism then
rules as follows: (A) SUB→ HAE, (B) HAE→ Indeterminism, (C) ¬Indeterminism; there-
fore (D) ¬SUB. There are four possible classes of response to this argument:
1. Accept both SUB and indeterminism, but argue that this indeterminism is acceptable.
2. Reject SUB and accept REL, arguing that the latter commits us only to LZE, thereby
avoiding the indeterminism.
3. Question (A), i.e. SUB→ HAE.
4. Question (B), i.e. HAE→ Indeterminism.
Option (1) can be seen as saving SUB by rejecting (C) and thereby embracing indetermin-
ism. Option (2) amounts to accepting the force of the hole argument, rejecting SUB accord-
ingly. Options (3) and (4) attempt to save SUB by calling into question premises (A) and (B)
of the hole argument, respectively. These options (1)-(4) provide a good means of situating all
mainstream responses to the hole argument. We will now review some popular approaches by
very briefly discussing each of these classes of response in turn.
(1) Accept the Indeterminism. A substantivalist might agree that accepting GR involves a
commitment to such haecceitistic distinctions and accept that the theory is indeterministic.
However, they might deny that this indeterminism is in any sense troublesome precisely be-
cause it is an indeterminism only about which objects instantiate which properties and not
about which patterns of properties are instantiated. [38]
(2) Accept Relationism, Reject Substantivalism. This is Earman and Norton’s preferred
response [10]. There are many possible subsequent relationist moves. One has been to treat
the metric field as just another material field [4, 45]. For example, for Brown, the metric
field only gains its usual “chronometrical significance” (i.e. only corresponds to the practical
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geometry manifest by the behaviour of material rods and clocks) in virtue of the particular
way it dynamically couples to matter [4]12.
(3) Question the Commitment to Haecceitistic Differences. The most popular substan-
tivalist response to the hole argument has been sophisticated substantivalism: a version of
substantivalism that denies the existence of physically possible spacetimes that differ merely
haecceitistically. The simplest way to secure this is to endorse antihaecceitism, i.e., the denial
of merely haecceitistic distinctions between possible worlds. In this case, W1 and W2 are
identical, and the indeterminism is removed. Thus, one can maintain a substantivalist position
and avoid the force of the hole argument. [38]
(4) Question that Haecceitistic Differences Commit us to Indeterminism. One can accept
HAE but reject indeterminism by rejecting premise (B) of hole argument. One way to do this
is to identify some means of identifying one of the Wi as a possible world, while rejecting
all others as possible worlds. Perhaps the most well-known such tactic is that of Maudlin,
who endorses the doctrine of “metric essentialism”. On this view, spacetime is an essentially
metrical object and the points of spacetime bear their metrical relations essentially. This
preferentially singles out of the of the worlds Wi as physical, thereby accepting ONE and so
circumventing the indeterminism [27]. An alternative option is endorsed by Brighouse [3] and
Pooley [38]: accept that GR is committed to haecceitistic distinctions but deny that it follows
that GR is indeterministic by redefining determinism, so that the concept is only sensitive to
qualitative differences.
5 The Interpretation of Dualities
With all this setup in hand, we are now in a position to assess possible interpretations of
string-theoretic dualities. We will find that, while there is no perfect analogy between such
dualities and the hole argument of GR, the wealth of literature on possible responses to the
hole argument can provide inspiration when it comes to the interpretation of dualities. Indeed,
12Note, though, that one is potentially misrepresenting Brown by labelling his position as relationist, since he
carefully avoids this terminology [4]. More generally, it is unclear whether this position is really faithful to all
possible forms of relationism: while the existence of manifold points is denied, there is a strong association of
the metric field with spacetime.
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while the analogy between the two cases has been pointed out in [43], there has yet to be any
systematic exploration in this direction.
Before we begin our analysis, it is worth making three general observations on the analogy
between the hole argument and the problem of string-theoretic dualities. First, there is no
direct analogy of indeterminism in the case of string-theoretic dualities. Nevertheless, there
is an analogous problem of an underdetermination as to which of a set of possible worlds Wi
represents the actual world. The underdetermination is problematic in the case of dualities
since dual theories often make highly different ontological claims about the world. The hope
is that there is a sufficiently strong analogy between the hole argument and the case of dualities
to mean that possible solutions to the former may yield interesting insights in the case of the
latter.
Second, unlike M1 and M2 in the case of the hole argument, the models of the two
dual theories T and T˜ are in general not isomorphic. This is easy to see in, for exam-
ple, the case of T-duality for the bosonic string: if the first model is specified by M =
〈M, gab (p) ,Φ (p) , Bab (p) , . . .〉, then the second model of the theory13 is specified by M˜ =
〈M, g˜ab (p) , Φ˜ (p) , B˜ab (p) , . . .〉. The fields for the second model are related to the fields of
the first model via the Buscher rules, and this mixing is highly non-trivial, unlike the two mod-
els in the hole argument, where the fields on the manifold for the two models are related by
a simple diffeomorphism. In other words, in the hole argument, all fields at p ∈ M in one
model are mapped to q ∈ M in the second model, whereas for dualities fields at p ∈ M may
generically be mapped to different manifold points in the second model; this mixing results in
a loss of isomorphism between the two models.
Third, it is worth noting that, in the case of e.g. mirror symmetry and gauge-gravity duality,
even the manifoldsM on which the dual field theories are defined are not necessarily the same
(i.e. topologically equivalent). It will turn out that this closes off some options that were open
to us in the case of the hole argument, where the manifold structure was the same for bothM1
andM2.
With these points in mind, let us begin to consider possible responses to the problem of
dualities. Teh [49], Knox [23] and Matsubara [26] all list possible responses to the apparent
13The same theory: recall that T-duality for the bosonic string is a self-duality.
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underdetermination in this case. For example, Matsubara gives the following options:
I. The two different theories T and T˜ give two models M and M˜ which describe two
genuinely distinct possible worlds W1 and W2, with it underdetermined which of these
worlds is the actual world. Given this interpretation, there are two possible alternatives:
[26]
(a) Accept that we have a genuine and problematic case of underdetermination.
(b) Identify “shared structure” between the two theories, and argue that only this shared
structure can properly be taken to describe the actual world. This route naturally
leads to weaker forms of realism, such as structural realism. [55]
II. Argue that T and T˜ give modelsM and M˜ which do not really describe different pos-
sible worlds after all.
While such classifications of possible responses to the problem of dualities are useful, we
must ask whether these options exhaust the possible responses. This is especially so in light of
the fact that the literature on dualities is abound with other apparently different responses; and
also in light of the fact that other options seem available when one considers the analogy with
the hole argument. In fact, by incorporating both of these considerations we are in a better
position to situate all possible responses in the dualities case. With this in mind, we lay out
below an extended range of responses to the case of dualities, labelled (1)-(4) in analogy with
the (1)-(4) presented in our discussion of the hole argument in the previous section.14
1. Dual theories T and T˜ give modelsM and M˜ which describe two different possible
worlds W1 and W2, only one of which could be the actual world. Within this response,
there are three sub-responses:
(a) Accept that modelsM and M˜ describe two different possible worlds W1 and W2,
either one of which could be the actual world. That is, accept that the dual theories
give a genuine case of strong underdetermination.
14Though there are subtle differences, discussed below.
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(b) Argue that models M and M˜ do globally describe two distinct possible worlds
W1 and W2, but that we can avoid the indeterminism by only applying each model
in restricted, non-overlapping regions of the parameter space of the actual world.15
(c) Reconcile the two theories by embedding them in a unique overarching theory T ∗.
2. Argue thatM and M˜ only really describe one possible world, and that the difference
between them is simply a gauge redundancy. (This is a rough analogue of some rela-
tionist approaches to the hole argument, such as [4].)
3. Change our metaphysical view of the manifold featuring in the models of the theories
T and T˜ in order to argue that the two models M and M˜ only really describe one
possible world. (This is the analogue of sophisticated substantivalist approaches to the
hole argument.)
4. Privilege one of the two dual theories, arguing that only the models of this theory de-
scribe physically possible worlds. (This is the analogue of Maudlin’s metric essentialist
approach to the hole argument [27].)
Our (1a) corresponds to Matsubara’s (Ia); his (Ib) we shall construe as a possible struc-
turalist approach response to (1a). Our (2), (3) and (4) fit into Matsubara’s (II), though he
considers none of these options. It is unclear whether our (1b) and (1c) should or should not
fall under Matsubara’s (II), though in his paper it is implicit that this is so [26]. For the rest
of this paper we shall not focus on the mundane task of comparing our list of responses with
those of others; though we shall say that our list of options is more comprehensive than others
presented in the literature up to this point.
Importantly, the options presented in our list above are not maximally mutually exclusive,
and in fact it may turn out that they are only coherent or defensible when taken in conjunction
with others. Indeed, one can arguably read Teh [49], Knox [23] and Rickles [42] as all de-
fending a combination of (1b), (1c) and (2); we shall ultimately join them in arguing that this
is one of the most defensible approaches to string-theoretic dualities.
Finally, it is worth making some further comments on (2) and (3) above and the analogous
approaches in the hole argument debate. Arguably, (3) can be viewed as a special case of (2):
15We shall discuss what is meant by parameter space of the actual world, and whether this notion is coherent.
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both claim that M and M˜ describe the same possible world, but (3) gives a more focussed
reason in terms of the ontology of manifold points. In the case of the hole argument, for
both the sophisticated substantivalist and the relationist who denies the existence of manifold
points, the choice of one of a range of diffeomorphically-related models is a mere gauge
choice; both of these approaches are, therefore, analogous to (2). However, we have treated
the sophisticated substantivalist analogue as an approach in its own right in the case of string
dualities to justify a more extensive evaluation of this option.
5.1 Dual Theories as Describing Distinct Possible Worlds
5.1.1 Underdetermination
As we have seen, string-theoretic dualities present a prima facie problem of strong underdeter-
mination of theory by evidence, since we have two theories T and T˜ with respective models
M and M˜ which correspond to two possible worlds W1 and W2 with distinct ontologies;
only one of these worlds can be the actual world. The first possible response, as given in our
list above, is simply to accept that this is a genuine case of underdetermination. If so, what
follows? Unlike the case of the hole argument, where one option was to argue that the indeter-
minism is not worrying since it amounts only to a question of which objects instantiate which
properties, it seems that such an option is less defensible in this instance. The reason is that,
as mentioned, the worlds described by T and T˜ are not isomorphic, as was the case for the
hole argument. Moreover, the ontological claims of the two models are often very different.
If one accepts that the underdetermination here is real, one might be led to weaken or
dismiss one’s previous realist attitudes in the philosophy of science. As Rickles states [42],
a positivist might well be no more fazed by dual descriptions than standard underdetermined
cases (such as Poincare´’s example of curved space versus distorting forces that have equivalent
empirical geometrical consequences [35,36]). Alternatively, one might choose to endorse con-
structive empiricism in order to avoid the threat of underdetermination from string-theoretic
dualities [7, 12], or some form of structural realism [8, 9, 26].
These discussions lead into familiar territory in the philosophy of science, albeit with
some interesting twists. For example, Rickles has argued that dualities might even present a
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case of structural underdetermination, thereby potentially posing problems for the structural
realist [42]. Moreover, it is worth noting that many (post-quantum mechanics) physicists are
likely to take some form of instrumentalist line towards string dualities, without concern for
ontological ramifications [5]. For the purposes of this essay, however, we shall continue to
focus on the task of accounting for dualities from a realist point of view. As such, we now
move on to consider the other possible responses to the case of string dualities.
5.1.2 Pluralism
One potential way to diffuse the underdetermination in the case of dualities is as follows: admit
that prima facie the respective modelsM and M˜ of the two theories T and T˜ describe two
different possible worlds if construed globally, but argue that they can both also concurrently
describe the actual world, if we partition the “parameter space” of the actual world such that
in some places in this space the world is to be described by M, and in other places it is to
be described by M˜. Physicists have made many suggestive comments along these lines. For
example, Susskind states:
[I]f one listens carefully, string theory is telling us that in a deep way reductionism
is wrong, at least beyond some point. ... In string theory the coupling constant is
not a constant; it is a field that can vary in spacetime. The field is called the dilaton
field. Thus, in a strong dilaton wave, there will be places where the fundamental
strings are the simplest objects, and other places where the D-strings are simplest.
In fact there will be places where the coupling is of order one where neither is
more elementary than the other. [48]
It is likely that Susskind has some form of S-duality in mind here: at regions where gs  1,
the physics is best described in terms of the ontology of the dual theory, with coupling g˜s ∼
1/gs
16. In fact, such sentiments are also echoed by philosophers of physics such as Rickles
(though, as will become clear later, pluralism in this sense does exhaust Rickles’ position):
Dual theories provide distinct but ultimately empirically equivalent representa-
tions. Do they thereby amount to underdetermination? I would argue that there
16Although Susskind talks of spacetime, we can continue to talk of an abstract parameter space.
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are crucial and subtle differences. The dual theories are not in competition: they
are complementary. They are both true in a sense, and the practice of physics sug-
gests, in many cases at least, a pluralistic stance with respect to the dual theories:
one theory is better equipped to describe some portion of parameter space than
another [in the sense that calculations performed using that theory are simpler
than those performed using its dual.] [42]
The main problem with this approach is making sense of the notion of parameter space
of the actual world. One possible response is to say that such talk is elliptical: in fact, we
need only consider the parameter space of one of our theories, say T . As long as gs < 1
in the models of this theory, we should indeed describe the world using the models of T .
However, at the points in the parameter space of T where we have models with gs ≥ 1, we
should switch to describing the world via the models of the dual theory T˜ . While this seems
to make good sense, and is likely what Susskind has in mind, it does not avoid the problem of
underdetermination in the case of dualities per se, since either theory can be used to describe
the world, even when coupling is large (one need only look to quantum chromodynamics for an
example of a strongly coupled theory which we take to be ontologically charged). Moreover,
this does not account for cases such as T-duality, where there is no parameter analogous to gs
by way of which analogous arguments can go through.
Are there any compelling reasons that the pluralist can give to always preference just one
ofM and M˜? If it can be demonstrated that one ofM and M˜ of the respective theories T
and T˜ is always pathological in some sense (for example, due to the presence of curvature
singularities), and if it can be convincingly argued that such pathological features mean that
such a model cannot represent the real world, then we might be able to establish metaphysical
grounds for always preferencing one ofM and M˜ (for a given point in the moduli space of
one of our two theories), and thereby advancing the pluralist position. Though this argument
has yet to be fleshed out in a compelling form, and it is perhaps unlikely that one of the two
dual models will always be pathological in this way, it is feasible that if such a task were
accomplished, this might yield a viable form of pluralism.
Another option is to attempt to embed the two theories T and T˜ into a deeper theory T ∗;
the (enlarged) moduli space of this deeper theory is then partitioned into domains in which
each of the two theories apply. This is akin to the idea behind modern talk of M-theory;
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whether the proposal fares any better shall be evaluated in the following subsection.
5.1.3 Unificationism
In the context of string theory, the network of duality relations between the various consistent
perturbative theories is taken as evidence that there is some deeper unifying theory of which
the string theories are offering glimpses. For the five superstring theories, this suspected
unifying theory is known as M-theory, and was first proposed by Witten in 1995 [21]. Witten
offers the following summary of the situation:
In uncompactified ten-dimensional Minkowski space, the strong-coupling limit
of the type I superstring is the weakly coupled heterotic SO (32) superstring; the
strong-coupling limit of the type IIA superstring is related to eleven-dimensional
supergravity; the strong coupling limit of type IIB theory is equivalent to the same
theory at weak coupling; and the strong-coupling limit of the E8 × E8 heterotic
string involves eleven-dimensional supergravity again. From this list, and addi-
tional items that appear after compactifying some dimensions, we learn that the
different theories are all one. The different superstring theories studied in differ-
ent ways in the last generation are different manifestations of one underlying, and
still mysterious theory, sometimes called M-theory.17 [53]
It is typically said that the various consistent superstring theories are distinguished points
in the moduli space of M-theory. Of course, the duality relationships between the theories
will hold independently of the existence of an M-theory, but in order to achieve a computable
scheme for the whole of the moduli space (including regions away from the distinguished
perturbation-friendly points) such an underlying theory is required [42].
The main problem with this approach is the following. Even if we embed T and T˜ in
T ∗ so that they describe limited regions of the moduli space of the deeper theory (see figure
(1)), this does not remove the fact that we still have two dual descriptions of the same physical
17One might reasonably question whether such observations do indeed warrant the inference to the existence
of M-theory: certainly, the existence of such a theory does not appear to be implied by such observations as a
matter of necessity. This point is discussed in more detail below.
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Figure 1: The embedding of the perturbative theories T and T˜ into a more fundamental theory T ∗.
The red circle indicates the parameter (moduli) space of T ∗. T and T˜ individually describe patches of
this parameter space, denoted A and B respectively. In this example, there exists a duality which takes
points in the parameter space of T with coupling parameter λ > 1 to points in the parameter space
of T˜ with λ < 1, and vice versa. This could therefore be some version of superstring S-duality with
λ = gs, or AdS/CFT duality with λ = λt′Hooft. In the former case a candidate for T ∗ is M-theory; in
the latter case a candidate for T ∗ is not known.
phenomena! So the unificationist strategy by itself cannot succeed. Indeed, even marrying
unificationism with the pluralism of the previous subsection, we do not necessarily avoid the
problem of dualities: pluralism provides us with a practical rule for when to use one model
over another (e.g. use the model with the smallest relevant coupling parameter: gs in the case
of S-duality); this does not mitigate the fact that we still could use either theory to describe the
same physics (unless our arguments based on pathology are independently justified). Hence,
whether separately or united, pluralism and unificationism do not necessarily seem to be able
to overcome the problem of underdetermination in the case of string dualities.
In fact, there is also another problem for this unificationist approach: the very notion that
such a unifying theory must exist is an unjustified assumption. While there is some suggestive
evidence to this end apropos superstring theory and M-theory, as yet even a partial formulation
of this theory is not on the horizon [44, 47]. Moreover, in the case of gauge-gravity dualities,
such a unifying theory is rarely spoken of, and there seems to be little consensus on whether
such a theory should exist [49]. Absent the details, the demand that some deeper theory must
exist in order to circumvent the underdetermination faces the charge of being ad hoc.
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As an aside, it is worth commenting on the special case where the moduli space of T ∗
is identical with the moduli spaces of the dual theories T and T˜ . Here, T and T˜ are iden-
tified as the same theory; the duality in question then becomes a self-duality. Though this
possibility is not widely countenanced in the case of string dualities, there are several plau-
sible cases in the history of physics where this phenomenon may have occurred. To take
two examples: (a) the demonstration of the empirical equivalence of Heisenberg’s matrix me-
chanics and Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics (two prima facie profoundly ontologically distinct
theories) [30, 31]; (b) the choice of Jordan frame versus Einstein frame in the Brans-Dicke
scalar-tensor theory of gravity [11].18
5.2 Dual Theories as Describing the Same World: Gauge Reductionism
In response to the hole argument, some relationists argue that we should not treat the mani-
fold as physical; therefore the indeterminism (which was a matter of which manifold points
instantiate which properties) is removed, and we can treat the situation as a simple gauge re-
dundancy. Is something analogous possible in the case of string-theoretic dualities, i.e. can
we identify the models of the two dual theories, just as we would identify states on gauge
orbits within a theory? As Rickles points out [42], the main problem with this approach is that
gauge redundancy as usually construed amounts to the identification of certain states of one
specific theory. While one can analogously identify models of self-dual theories, is not clear
that this makes sense for dualities that are not self-dualities, where we would require some
inter-theoretic notion of model identification.
Let us be more concrete. While it is possible to make sense of self-dualities from the
perspective of gauge redundancy (for example, T-dual models for the bosonic string can be
identified; the choice of one or the other is then equivalent to a choice of gauge [42] – and
typically, as with gauge fixing, we will choose the model which is most convenient), what of
inter-theoretic dualities, such as the AdS/CFT correspondence, or any of the dualities which
relate two different superstring theories? The problem is that the notion of identifying physical
states across theories is in general not well-defined.
18The author intends to investigate in detail such candidate cases of dualities in the history of physics in a
future paper.
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The most natural response to this problem is to endorse the unificationist standpoint de-
tailed above. This solves the problem as it allows us to embed both dual theories within the
parameter space of some deeper theory; then models of the theories T and T˜ , which corre-
spond to points in the parameter space of the unifying theory T ∗ can then be identified, since
they now belong to the same parameter space. Then, one can identify models across these
theories. Hence we see that the unificationist response and the gauge reductionist response go
hand-in-hand.
In fact, this leads us to a defensible interpretation of string dualities: a combination of
pluralism, unificationism, and gauge reductionism. The story runs as follows: we postulate
some deeper theory T ∗; T and T˜ describe respective patches A and B of the overarching
parameter space of the theory as in figure (1). Each point in A corresponds to a model of
T , and each point in B corresponds to a model of T˜ . Embedding the parameter spaces of
T and T˜ within the overarching parameter space of T ∗ allows us to identify points in A and
B which are related by a duality; choosing to describe the world via one than the other then
amounts to a specific gauge choice. The principle via which one should choose a “gauge” (i.e.
dual theory) to describe the world is one such as Susskind’s, as presented in our discussion of
pluralism. The ultimately ontology of the world should be described in terms of T ∗. A view
akin to this is endorsed by Teh [49], Knox [23], Huggett [19] and Rickles [42]. Naturally, the
biggest problem lies in the first step: finding an overarching theory T ∗ to begin with!
5.3 Sophisticated Substantivalism Analogies?
One possible approach to string theory dualities only becomes apparently after considering the
sophisticated substantivalist solution to the hole argument. To recap, the sophisticated substan-
tivalist adopts the antihaecceitistic thesis that two worlds cannot differ solely with regard to
which objects instantiate which properties, so that GR modelsM1 andM2 only describe one
possible world. The question is: could such an account also allow us to avoid the underde-
termination which appears to arise in the context of string-theoretic dualities? Unfortunately,
this response seems doomed to fail.
To see this, first note that whileM1 andM2 are isomorphic models in the case of the hole
argument, this is not in general true for the two modelsM and M˜ in the case of string theoret-
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ical dualities, as we have already seen. If there is no longer an isomorphism between the two
dual descriptions, then saying that the models differ solely in regard of which objects instan-
tiate which properties, and therefore only correspond to one possible world, is not so simple.
Second, mirror symmetry and gauge-gravity duality make it apparent that two dual theories
can have topologically inequivalent manifolds. Hence, this kind of approach to dualities seems
fundamentally misguided, because we do not even have a uniquely defined manifold between
the two models. [41, 42]
5.4 Preferencing One Dual Theory
Consider the specific case of the AdS/CFT correspondence. Oriti points out that most string
theorists tend to speak as if the four-dimensional spacetime of the boundary gauge theory
is real, with the bulk spacetime appearing as an auxiliary construction [33]. For example,
Horowitz and Polchinski note that the AdS/CFT correspondence is a little different from other
dualities in that the gauge theory side is exactly understood, while the string theory side is
only approximately understood [18]. Building on this, they write:
In the AdS/CFT case, the situation may not be so symmetric, in that for now the
gauge side has an exact description and the string/gravity side only an approxi-
mate one: we might take the point of view that strings and spacetime are emergent
and that the ultimate precise description of the theory will be in variables closer
to the CFT form. [18]
Here, Horowitz and Polchinski appear to be using the explanatory primacy of the gauge
theoretical description (the CFT side) in support of a thesis about its ontological primacy. In
fact, such a position is presented in a wealth of popular literature on the AdS/CFT correspon-
dence - see for example [6, 13, 24]. The question is: why does the epistemic fact about what
human beings happen to currently know about two dual theories relative to one another war-
rant the metaphysical conclusion that the theory we currently know more about must give the
correct description of the world? Such worries have been expressed by Teh [49], Knox [23],
and Rickles [42]. What we need is some argument to the effect that one description of the
world has metaphysical priority over its dual, given that the duality relation is formally sym-
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metric [40]. Unfortunately, as Teh points out, “We have no good reason to think of the grav-
itational side of the duality as metaphysically emergent from the gauge theory side, or vice
versa.” [49]
Though this observation is reasonable at this point, it is at least worth considering one way
in which the metaphysical primacy of one of the dual theories might be established. If it can be
demonstrated that one ofM and M˜ of the respective theories T and T˜ is pathological in the
sense discussed in section 5.1.2, then we might be able to establish grounds for preferencing
one ofM and M˜. If in every case the models of T end up being preferenced over the models
of T˜ in this way, then we might obtain some principled reason for thinking that T rather than
T˜ correctly represents the ontology of the world.19 Hence we see that it might be possible to
defend this position on dualities, but we require defensible grounds for preferencing one of
the two dual theories which are not obviously forthcoming.
6 Conclusions and Outlook
In this essay, we have used the literature on candidate solutions to the hole argument of GR as a
springboard to categorising solutions to the apparent problem of strong underdetermination in
the context of dualities. We have found that, in our ensuing categorisation of possible solutions
to this problem, the options available are not mutually exclusive; and in fact a combination
of pluralism, unificationism, and gauge reductionism seems to offer one of the most viable
interpretations of the phenomenon. Though many of the other potential options do not appear
promising, we have also found that the tactic of giving metaphysical priority to the models
of one of the dual theories (whether on a local scale as with pluralism, or on a global scale
as discussed in section 5.4) in order to privilege its ontological claims would be tenable, if a
convincing metaphysical grounding could be found.
It is interesting to note that theoretical physicists tend to endorse both these approaches to
dualities, but in different contexts. The attitude of Horowitz and Polchinski towards gauge-
gravity duality - whereby the gauge theory is awarded ontological priority over the bulk theory
(often, as we have seen, by fiat, or for philosophically unmotivated reasons) is ubiquitous in
19If, on the other hand, which ofM or M˜ is preferenced depends on the point in the moduli space of one of
the two theories under consideration, then we are led to the defensible form of pluralism already discussed.
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the literature on this subject [18]. On the other hand, the attitude towards superstring dualities
is often roughly in line with our tripartite unificationist account above. In fact, authors often
run these interpretations together, and switch between examples of superstring and gauge-
gravity dualities in a way that is unclear and confused. Thus, we hope that this essay serves
to clarify the most acceptable solutions to the problem of dualities, where these solutions are
most reasonably applied, and the assumptions that go into them.
Of course, both the above-mentioned solutions rest on the need for future work, if they
are to prove tenable. In the tripartite unificationist strategy, an underlying theory T ∗ needs to
be found, both in the superstring duality case (where M-theory is currently the most plausible
candidate), and the the gauge-gravity case (where no such candidate is forthcoming). On
the approach which seeks to give metaphysical priority to one of a pair of dual theories, a
principled philosophical reason for this choice needs to be given. Simply in virtue of the fact
that (a) the duality relationship is formally symmetric, and (b) it does not appear that one of
the dual models is always pathological in any obvious sense, we remain reserved about this
latter approach. Thus, the unificationist strategy may offer the best hopes for making sense of
dualities in a way that avoids any problematic underdetermination.
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